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 ARTICLE 
RSP Redux: Is IRC Section 83’s 
Overreach “in [C]onnection with the 
[P]erformance of [S]ervices” the Real 
“[U]nwarranted and [U]nintended” 
Result? 
Charles F. McCormick* 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the effects of IRC § 83 from the perspective of those 
most often subject to it. While § 83 remains a critical tax consideration for 
entrepreneurs, this article concludes that § 83 has become, in practice, a 
solution searching for a problem that in fact causes more problems than it 
solves. Drafters of § 83 believed they were closing a significant loophole 
regarding the taxation of executive compensation. Looking at the problem 
legislators believed they were solving in the context of contemporary ex-
ecutive compensation structures, it is hard to understand what the actual 
problem was. Section 83(b) was supposed to offer a convenient solution. 
In reality, its arbitrary 30-day deadline serves as a potentially devastating 
trap for the unwary. From a policy perspective, cleverly titled laws, such 
as the JOBS Act, were enacted under the guise of helping entrepreneurs 
and small businesses and promoting capital formation. Results have been 
less than stunning. Real reform lies in simplifying the capital formation 
process and incentivizing entrepreneurs. If doing that requires going back 
to the proverbial drawing board, we should admit that and move forward. 
Sections I–IV of this article review IRC § 83 from a mechanical, economic, 
and broader policy perspective. Sections V and VI identify specific, prac-
tical, contemporary problems that arise in applying § 83 to entrepreneurial 
and capital formation activities, particularly in comparison to substantively 
similar activities, such as issuing incentive stock options. Section VII pro-
poses modest and simple, but effective reforms that remain mindful of the 
broader goals of tax neutrality. 
                                                          
* Charles F. McCormick, JD, University of Chicago Law School, BA, Fordham College, is a founding 
partner of McCormick & O’Brien, LLP. The author wishes to thank Professor Raymond H. Brescia of 
Albany Law School for his helpful guidance and suggestions. Gerad Soman assisted in the research and 
preparation of this article and provided helpful comments and suggestions while serving as a Law Clerk 
at the Firm. Any errors, omissions or other imperfections are entirely my own. 
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I.  OVERVIEW 
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 83 assures that stock compensation paid to 
company executives is taxed. However, a broad reading of the rule leads to incon-
gruous results and divergent tax treatment of substantively similar executive com-
pensation in the form of stock options. Section 83(b) is intended to provide some 
relief, but in practice may create an administrative burden that, if ignored, can have 
significant negative tax consequences. Considerations of consistency, efficiency, 
incentives, and fairness all support a limited safe harbor for some restricted stock 
grants. Such a measure could be properly described as revenue neutral, compared 
to the current structure, and would affirm policy support for entrepreneurial initia-
tives. It might even be a good example of how “progress” sometimes involves look-
ing at the past in a new light. 
II. IRC § 83 STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS 
Section 83 of the IRC is a vital aspect of the tax code for startups and their 
employees.1 It addresses the tax consequences of issuing and accepting equity as 
payment for services. Specifically, § 83(a) states if “property” (e.g., stock) is trans-
ferred “in connection with the performance of services,” then the recipient must 
include the difference between the fair market value (“FMV”) of the stock and the 
price paid for the stock as ordinary income.2 In doing so, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (“IRS”) is equating the tax treatment of cash and non-cash compensation.3 If 
an employee was paid in cash, there would be little dispute that the payment should 
be included in the recipient’s taxable income in the year in which it was paid. With 
stock issuance, however, the “payment” is the difference between the value of the 
stock received and the amount the recipient paid for the stock.4 Call it an “employee 
discount,” but then ask yourself why a discount on the purchase of stock is treated 
differently than a discount on merchandise (e.g., Ralph Lauren employees getting a 
40% discount on clothing purchases),5 particularly because the former is an invest-
ment, and the latter is consumption. 
Section 83(a) appears to offer an accommodation to recipients of restricted 
stock.6 If the “property” received is subject to a “substantial risk of forfeiture” (such 
as a vesting schedule) that will terminate at some point (a “lapse restriction”), then 
the recipient can elect to defer having to pay tax on the recipient’s receipt of stock 
compensation until the first taxable year that the property is not subject to a sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture (when the shares vest).7 After all, why pay taxes on some-
thing until you actually have it? Alternatively, under § 83(b), a recipient may elect 
                                                          
 1. I.R.C. § 83 (2018). 
 2. Id. § 83(a). 
 3. Unfortunately, the same IRS does not maintain this equivalency regarding the form of payment 
that it accepts. 
 4. I.R.C. § 83(b). For more on this subject, see generally Raising Money, Issuing Shares and Dis-
tributing Assets, AM. B. ASS’N  63 (2003), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0021/materi-
als/books.pdf. 
 5. See I.R.C. § 132(a)(2). 
 6. Id. § 83(a). 
 7. Id. § 83(a). 
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to pay tax on the difference between the FMV of the property at the time of transfer 
and the price the recipient paid.8 
Whether or not it is in the employee’s interest to make the election depends in 
part on her specific financial situation and her assessment of the company’s future.9 
Making a § 83(b) election could be viewed as an opportunity to pay a smaller 
amount of tax right away in favor of possibly having to pay a larger amount of tax 
in the future. If the employee believes the shares are likely to increase in value, the 
initial tax payment is manageable, and she will indeed satisfy the vesting require-
ments, making the § 83(b) election would be tax-efficient (and economically pru-
dent). However, if some or all of the preceding conditions are not present, the ben-
efit of paying the tax right away also creates a risk she will both lose that money 
and never realize the tax (or other) benefits from owning the stock. 
For founders — and others present at the inception of a company — making a 
§ 83(b) election can be an easier choice as the shares of a newly formed company 
with no revenues or assets may have a low or even de minimis FMV. However, even 
in this instance, founders would need to complete a § 83(b) election.10 Moreover, 
the dilemma of whether or not to file a § 83(b) election can arise quickly after a 
company’s launch — particularly if the company accepts seed-equity capital, or 
acquires a significant customer. Thus, this dilemma may create the wrong incentives 
when considering company formation and entrepreneurial activity. 
It is unremarkable that § 83 is one of the many trade-offs found within the 
current tax code. However, as discussed further in this article, specific applications 
of § 83 frustrate the legitimate purposes of the law, result in different tax treatment 
for the same substantive activities, and create the wrong incentives for company 
formation and entrepreneurial ventures. A reasonable safe harbor (that might actu-
ally amount to a return to the status quo before § 83 was adopted) would be a wel-
come addition. 
III.  THE REAL ECONOMICS OF STOCK COMPENSATION IN STARTUPS 
It is worth noting that the universal — perhaps inescapable — practice of an 
early stage company paying its employees and consultants with stock is, in eco-
nomic terms, an inefficient choice.11 Equity remains the highest cost of capital, 
                                                          
 8. Id. § 83(b) (emphasis added). 
 9. See generally David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B. U. L.  REV. 695, 
708–19 (2004) (discussing various factors affecting the long-term value of equity compensation to em-
ployees); Geri Terzo, Pros & Cons of Issuing Common Stock, CHRON, http://smallbusi-
ness.chron.com/pros-cons-issuing-common-stock-55949.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
 10. 26 I.R.C. § 83(b). 
 11. Sean F. Reid, Matthew L. O’Connor & Steven J. Shapiro, The Valuation of Employee Stock Op-
tions Issued by Closely Held Firms, 13 J. LEGAL ECON., 19, 23 (2006) (“Startup firms often lack adequate 
cash flow to pay competitive salaries for talented employees and executives. To lure these desirable 
employees and executives to the startup firm, as well as retain their services as the company matures, a 
lucrative ESO package may be the most critical component of the compensation package.”); see also 
Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based Compensation, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1439-1440 (2007) (“The main reason is that employees, like most people, are risk-
averse. Since the value of option grants fluctuates due to factors beyond the employee’s control, options 
are an extremely risky asset from her perspective. Moreover, employees are tied, along with their human 
capital, to the firm; putting much of their personal wealth in options means putting all their eggs in one 
basket and further increasing their risk. Taken together, the risk-bearing factor would cause employees 
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never more so than regarding the first equity issued by a company.12 Companies use 
stock to pay employees because they have to, not because they want to.13 In most 
cases, stock is simply the only currency available to a startup company to use as 
payment.14 That said, this form of payment is only available at all because employ-
ees are willing to accept it. Thus (in addition to being a rare example of delayed 
gratification in our culture), employees accepting stock as payment can be fairly 
described, in economic terms, as an investment. If company and business formation 
is indeed a desirable societal goal, the tax code could — as it does in various other 
places — provide incentives to encourage a practice promoting company formation. 
At the very least, the tax code could avoid penalizing this form of investment. 
IV.  ECONOMIC AND POLICY BASES FOR IRC § 83 
There are at least two separate economies in the United States — the “money” 
economy, and the “barter” (sometimes called the “underground” or “shadow”) 
economy.15 The money economy is far larger and much better documented.16 Es-
sentially, all economic statistics (e.g., GDP) are derived from data limited to the 
money economy.17 On the other hand, the barter economy remains a black box; 
although some have estimated the annual size of the U.S.’s barter economy to be 
                                                          
to accept much lower compensation in cash over an option grant with equivalent market value. There-
fore, payment with options, which employees value less, is expensive currency for firms. Furthermore, 
since no one can go to the grocery store with options, they cannot replace the employee’s entire salary. 
Thus options usually supplement - at least in part - regular salary, further increasing the cost of options 
to the firm and its shareholders. The incentives that options create must overcome these costs to make 
option grants worthwhile.”). See generally David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation 
and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611 (2011). 
 12. Founders’ realization of this fact may well explain the current prevalence of issuing convertible 
notes rather than priced equity rounds in early stage financings. See, e.g., Charles F. McCormik, “The 
Princess Di Problem” of Convertible Note Financings, MCCORMIK & OBRIEN, LLP, https://www.busi-
ness.com/images/content/58a/e22af2b87b1a9242b871e/0-0-/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018) (my previous 
article). 
 13. At inception, companies and their founders are often not economically distinct. It is neither eco-
nomically efficient nor inefficient for a sole founder to issue herself 100% of the stock of the company 
she forms for her business. Once the founder and the company are economically distinct, however, equity 
is a costly form of payment. Companies and investors often claim that having employees own the com-
pany’s stock or stock options better aligns the interests between employees and owners (by blurring this 
economic distinction). However, this “choice” is also often necessitated by the limited cash available to 
incipient companies (thus making it less of a choice and more of a necessity). 
 14. See generally Joseph S. Tibbetts, Jr. & Edmund T. Donovan, Compensation and Benefits for 
Startup Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 1989), https://hbr.org/1989/01/compensation-and-ben-
efits-for-startup-companies. 
 15. See generally Drew A. Swank, Welfare, Income Detection, and the Shadow Economy, 8 RUTGERS 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 614, 626–31 (2011); Marco Rabinowitz, Rise of the Shadow Economy: Second Larg-
est Economy in the World, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2011, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/benzin-
gainsights/2011/11/07/rise-of-the-shadow-economy-second-largest-economy-in-the-
world/#51ed09a04a0e. 
 16. See Swank, supra note 14, at 630–31 (discussing the difficulty of measuring the shadow econ-
omy); Rabinowitz, supra note 14. 
 17. See Arnold J. Katz, An Overview of BEA’s Source Data and Estimating Methods for Quarterly 
GDP, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS 3 (Nov. 6, 2006), https://www.bea.gov/pa-
pers/pdf/china_source_data_estimating_methods.pdf; see also Databases, Tables & Calculators by Sub-
ject, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018); Data, FED. RES., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
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approximately 5% of the size of the overall U.S. economy.18 Despite the IRS’s best 
efforts,19 the U.S. tax system does not have much luck assessing taxes outside of 
the money economy.20 Section 83 can thus be seen as an effort to tax bona fide 
employee compensation paid in the form of stock rather than money. 
It is difficult to tax stock compensation because the value of stock in private 
companies is not easily calculated.21 The addition of factors like sale restrictions 
and vesting provisions only makes these calculations harder.22 Under the law that 
existed prior to the enactment of § 83, the recipient of restricted stock would only 
be taxed when all such restrictions expired, thus, creating a disparity between the 
taxation of cash compensation, which was taxable immediately, and restricted stock 
compensation.23 To make matters worse, there seems to have been some concern 
that these arrangements, known as “restricted stock plans,” were merely a clever 
scheme concocted by employers and employees to defer (or control the timing of) 
an employee’s tax liability.24 
Importantly, lawmakers at the time appear to have rejected the familiar con-
temporary understanding of restricted stock plans as serving the same purpose as 
stock option plans.25 Instead, in its report, the Senate Finance Committee (“Com-
mittee”) found a closer comparison in what it called “nonexempt employees trusts,” 
which it explained may be funded with “stock in the employer corporation, stock of 
another company — often an unrelated growth company — or even shares of a 
mutual fund.”26 The Committee’s comparative analysis of restricted stock plans and 
stock option plans is worth quoting in its entirety: 
It has been suggested by some that restricted stock plan[s] are not in fact, 
deferred compensation arrangements, but rather are a means of allowing 
                                                          
 18. Niall McCarthy, The Countries with the Largest Shadow Economies [Infographic], FORBES (Feb. 
9, 2017, 8:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/02/09/where-the-worlds-shadow-
economies-are-firmly-established-infographic/#64f72d5a742c. 
 19. Bartering Tax Center, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-busi-
nesses-self-employed/bartering-tax-center (last visited Oct. 18, 2017). 
 20. See, e.g., Edgar L. Feige, New Estimates of Overseas U.S. Currency Holdings, the underground 
Economy and the “Tax Gap”, MUNICH PERS. REPEC ARCHIVE 1 (Apr. 24, 2011, 5:02 PM), 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30353/3/MPRA_paper_30353.pdf (calculating that in 2010, 18-19% 
of total reportable income in the U.S. was not properly reported to the IRS). 
 21. Reid, O’Connor & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 24 (“The typical pre-IPO startup firm has an ex-
tremely uncertain future. Because of this uncertainty in the value of the company, the value of the options 
on the underlying stock is extremely difficult to estimate.”); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of 
Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 445, 490–92 (2017) (outlin-
ing specific difficulties in valuing private securities in the absence of a market price). See generally 
Private Company Valuation, CFA INST., https://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/products/publica-
tions/inv/.../equity_chapter9.ppt (last visited Apr. 18, 2018); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Information 
Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 203–04 (2012) (describing economic consequences 
of such difficulty). 
 22. See Reid, O’ Connor & Shapiro, supra note 10, at 25–26. See, e.g., Robert Heaton, How to value 
your startup stock options, ROBERTHEATON.COM (Nov. 2, 2015), https://rob-
ertheaton.com/2015/11/02/how-to-value-your-startup-stock-options/. 
 23. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearing on H.R. 13270 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 91st 
Cong. 50 (1969) (statement of the Honorable David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury). 
 24. Id. (In particular, Secretary Kennedy’s Statement cited “rapid growth in the number of so-called 
‘restricted stock plans,’” and his view that current tax law “amounted to an unwarranted an unintended 
benefit.”) (emphasis added). 
 25. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 120–21 (1969). 
 26. Id. at 119. 
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key employees to become shareholders in the business.  This line of rea-
soning, however, overlooks the fact that in 1964 Congress specifically 
dealt with the matter of the appropriate means by which key employees 
could be provided with a stake in the business when it revised the treatment 
of qualified employee stock options.27 
In the modern context, it would be fair to say that the distinction the Committee 
understood between deferred compensation plans and “a means of allowing key 
employees to become shareholders in the business” is as puzzling as a modern cor-
porate compensation program that offers employees shares of another company.28 
Given that Congress and the Treasury had specific, well-developed ideas re-
garding the structure and taxation of employee stock ownership plans, it seems they 
believed restricted stock plans created a disparity between the tax treatment of re-
stricted stock arrangements and other recognized stock ownership programs.29 In 
particular, since they had previously issued the definitive (and apparently exclusive) 
word on employee stock ownership programs in the form of IRC § 421, et seq., 
there was no reason to consider (or even recognize) any alternatives.30 
To summarize, the impetus behind the enactment of IRC § 83 in 1969 appears 
to have been achieving uniformity and consistency in the taxation of employee 
stock ownership programs, and closing what was considered at the time to be a 
glaring loophole in the tax code. While all of these goals sound sensible and rational, 
by rejecting the idea that restricted stock programs fundamentally are employee 
stock ownership programs, IRC § 83 has fallen short in these areas. Worse than that, 
these shortfalls can have unhealthy effects on essential components of company 
formation and entrepreneurial activity. Fundamentally, it appears policymakers at 
the time missed, or ignored, the dual economic nature of stock compensation as 
both compensation and investment — and arguably more so the latter than the for-
mer — on the part of the recipient. Let’s fix that. 
V.  THE WIDE NET CAST BY THE WORDS “IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES”: CONTEMPORARY, PRACTICAL 
PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION OF IRC §83 
As a general legal principle, laws that impose restrictions or obligations are 
interpreted narrowly, while laws that confer or protect rights or benefits are inter-
preted broadly.31  At least they should be in a system where the government derives 
its rights and powers from the people, rather than the other way around.   
                                                          
 27. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (“[I]n 1964 Congress specifically dealt with the matter of the appropriate means by which key 
employees could be provided with a stake in the business when it revised the treatment of qualified 
employee stock options.”). 
 31. See generally Stephanie Hall Barclay, Retained by the People: Federalism, the Ultimate Sover-
eign, and Natural Limits on Government Power, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 257, 298–99 (2014); 
Gary Lawson & Robert Schapiro, Common Interpretation: The Tenth Amendment, CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-x (last visited Jan. 29, 
2018). 
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The IRS, unfortunately, interprets the language of § 83, “in connection with the 
performance of services” broadly,32 going so far as to clarify that the “performance” 
of services also includes refraining from the performance of services, and such ser-
vices include “past, present or future” services.33 More critically, the language “in 
connection with” can be applied so broadly as to cover transactions (i.e., “transfers” 
of stock) that are not compensatory in substance — and may actually be just the 
opposite. Keeping in mind that an income tax law should probably limit its focus to 
taxing income — this is an unfortunate result.34 Secondly, the IRS interprets the 
term “transfer” so broadly as to include instances that commend form over sub-
stance, even where adjacent areas of the tax code clearly impose no immediate tax-
ation.35  Below are a few specific scenarios worth noting. 
A.  Founders Contributing Property at the Formation of the Com-
pany    
Assume that, in connection with A and B forming XCorp, A contributes a soft-
ware program with an agreed FMV of $1MM, and B contributes computer equip-
ment with an agreed FMV of $1MM. A and B each receive 1,000 shares of common 
stock in exchange for the property they contribute, but each also agrees to subject 
her shares to a four-year reverse vesting schedule. Under IRC § 351, the exchange 
of property for stock should not be a taxable event.36 However, if the vesting sched-
ule is deemed to be evidence of an agreement to remain working for the new com-
pany for the vesting period, then a literal application of IRC § 83 — a transfer of 
property in connection with the performance of services — would require A and B 
to either recognize ordinary income upon the vesting of their shares, or make a § 
                                                          
 32. The seminal case in this area is arguably a Tax Court case that was affirmed by the 9th Circuit, 
Alves v. Comm’r, 734 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984) (In its decision, the Tax Court notes that approximately 
one month after Mr. Alves purchased his shares of common stock for $0.10 each, the company sold 
shares of preferred stock for $3.10 each – equating to a 97% discount for Mr. Alves! Interestingly, the 
Court did not cite this fact in the explanation of its ruling. However, doing so may have better substan-
tiated the Court’s decision than reciting the provisions of corporate minutes and Mr. Alves’s employment 
agreement at length. In sum, the Alves decision may well have been a sound application of the step 
transaction doctrine rather than a tortured statutory interpretation.); see also Victor Fleischer, Taxing 
Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 103 (2011) (citing Testimony of Jack S. Levin to the House Ways 
& Means Committee, KIRKLAND 3 (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.kirkland.com/files/Levin_Testi-
mony_090607.pdf) (“Or if an innovative entrepreneur like Bill Gates and his investor group start a com-
pany, is (or should) the entrepreneur’s long-term capital gain on sale of the computer company’s stock 
be converted into ordinary income because he had many sweaty armpit days? My point is that the Code 
does not make, and never has made, the absence or presence of activity and ingenuity - or even a bit of 
bodily dampness - the test for long-term capital gain, nor should we now legislatively adopt a test re-
quiring IRS agents to poke around in Warren Buffett’s or Bill Gates’ dirty laundry searching for perspi-
rational evidence.”). 
 33. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (as amended in 2014); see also Fisher v. Comm’r, No. 92-2457, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21018, at *2 (1st Cir. Aug. 20, 1993). 
 34. And for an interesting suggestion that so imposing income tax on this form of unrealized income 
may violate the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, see Ronald Hindin, Internal Revenue Code 
Section 83 Restricted Stock Plans, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 298 (1974). 
 35. Alves, 734 F.2d at 478 (“Congress . . . has clearly expressed the intention that Section 83 is to have 
the broadest application.”). 
 36. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2018) (“General rule. No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred 
to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock in such corporation and immediately 
after the exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined in § 368(c) of the corporation.”)). 
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83(b) election.37 Had the statutory language been more narrowly drafted — perhaps 
the following: “a transfer of property substantially in exchange for/as compensation 
for the performance of services” — IRC § 83 would arguably be inapplicable. 
An exemption from § 83 here would not be a repugnant result. Here, it is clearer 
to see the mutually imposed reverse vesting restrictions as a distinct business ar-
rangement between A and B (such as a co-sale or first offer right), rather than a 
trigger that should cause the underlying issuance of the stock to be taxed as com-
pensation. Each Founder is requiring the other to forego other opportunities, 38 lest 
one Founder leave it entirely to the other to undertake the substantial work required 
to launch a new company. In other words, even if A and B respectively contribute 
the boat and the oars, if they want to get anywhere they both have to row. Accord-
ingly, it is difficult to understand how the mutually-imposed vesting feature should 
allow the IRS to re-characterize the formation of XCorp as a taxable event. 
B.  Buying Stock Along with Investors 
Here, an investor purchasing preferred stock in a company asks the founders 
and or other employees to purchase shares of common stock, and that such shares 
be subject to vesting schedules.39 For the sake of simplicity, assume that the shares 
of common stock are sold at a lower price per share than the shares of preferred 
stock, but that the price was established based on a contemporaneous valuation 
opinion quantifying the price difference between the preferred and common stock.40  
Were these common shares issued “in connection with the performance of ser-
vices?” IRS guidance is not helpful. Had the founders or employees purchased the 
same preferred stock as the investor, they may be outside of the reach of § 83. 
Treasury Regulation § 1.83-3(f) states the following: 
The existence of other persons entitled to buy stock on the 
same terms and conditions as an employee, whether pursuant to a pub-
lic or private offering may, however, indicate that in such circumstances a 
                                                          
 37. § 351(d) (“Services, certain indebtedness, and accrued interest not treated as property. For pur-
poses of this section, stock issued for . . . services . . . shall not be considered as issued in return for 
property.”). 
 38. As discussed above, the reference in Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) defines the “performance” of services 
as including “refraining” from any such performance.  However, to describe the affirmative requirement 
to work for XCorp as the requirement to “refrain” from working anywhere else, ignores the substance 
of the economic agreement. 
 39. James K. Baer & Mara Morner-Ritt, Surviving the Nuclear Winter, 24 L.A. LAW. 24, 27 (2001) 
(“Venture capitalists are increasingly requiring that the equity remaining in the hands of the founders 
vest over a period of time (usually two to four years, with a portion, such as 10%, to vest upon the closing 
of the initial investment). The stock of the founders will continue to vest only so long as they remain 
employed over the vesting time period. To implement vesting, the founders grant the company or the 
investors the option to purchase the founders’ unvested stock at a price based upon the purchase price 
paid by the venture capitalists in their investment. Thus, for example, if the purchase price and the con-
version price of the preferred stock purchased by the venture capitalists is $1 per share, the common 
stock held by the founders would be subject to repurchase at $1 per share.”). See also Bo Yaghmaie, 
Vesting: A Founder’s Need to Earn Equity, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.entrepre-
neur.com/article/231044. 
 40. Commonly referred to as a “409A Valuation” or a “409A Opinion”. 
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transfer to the employee is not in recognition of the performance of, or the 
refraining from performance of, services.41 
As highlighted, the “same terms and conditions” requirement may be hard to 
apply where the employees are purchasing a different class of stock for a different 
price per share.  If so, then the IRS may view this “transfer” of common stock to be 
“in connection with the performance of services,” and thus susceptible to § 83.42 
This result makes little sense. A likely reason for such a series of transactions 
is that the investors required the founders or employees to purchase stock alongside 
them in order to align incentives, but were unwilling to afford them the privileges 
and preferences of the preferred stock the investors bought.43 In particular, the com-
mon rationale for a preferred stock liquidation preference — that actual dollars in-
vested should have greater downside protection than “sweat equity” — does not 
apply.44 Both the investors and the employees would pay actual dollars for their 
shares, but in a liquidation scenario, only the preferred stockholders would have the 
benefit of a liquidation preference.45 
To claim that the vesting condition was in exchange for the “lower” price per 
share misses the point since the common shares should indeed have a lower price 
than the preferred shares, given the preferred stock’s additional preferences and 
privileges. In sum, there is no colorable “compensatory” aspect of the common 
stock transfer,46 yet current IRS rules characterize this purchase of common stock 
as a taxable event to the employee purchaser.47 A preferable treatment would be to 
not penalize founders or employees who purchase stock in their own companies so 
long as they pay FMV for their shares. 
C.  Agreeing to Vesting in Connection with a Later Third-Party 
Investment 
Here, a group of founders may have issued stock to themselves at the inception 
of their company, but chose not to impose vesting schedules on themselves or one 
                                                          
 41. “May” is the operative term here, as Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) should not be interpreted as a safe 
harbor. (emphasis added). 
 42. See Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. Comm’r, No. 30290-88, 1991 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 65, at *29–
30 (T.C. Feb. 6, 1991) (Section 83 applies to the grant of an option to pay the same price as an outsider 
agrees to pay, even when terms and conditions are different.). 
 43. See Baer & Morner-Ritt, supra note 38, at 27–28; see also Mark Suster, First Round Funding 
Terms and Founder Vesting, BOTH SIDES TABLE (Aug. 17, 2009), https://bothsidesofthetable.com/first-
round-funding-terms-and-founder-vesting-3ff81f55c7bd. 
 44. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders’ Stock, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 1085, 1092 (2012). See also Charles Yu, The Ultimate Guide to Liquidation Preferences, 
MEDIUM (Jan. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/@CharlesYu/the-ultimate-guide-to-liquidation-prefer-
ences-478dda9f9332. 
 45. Yu, supra note 43. 
 46. Other than the possible argument that only the founder/employees were afforded the opportunity 
to purchase the shares at all. 
 47. The language of the second sentence of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (2016) has been read to codify this 
incongruity (i.e., taxing investment as compensation). Note, however, the timidity (but perhaps temerity) 
with which this idea is presented: “realizing no bargain element in the transaction does not preclude the 
use of [a Section 83(b)] election . . .” (emphasis added).  It is true but nonetheless disappointing that the 
IRS’s position is that it is not impermissible to pay tax where no income is realized. 
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another.48 An outside investor leading a significant round (or making a significant 
investment) may require the founders to accept vesting of their founder shares.49  
Should the founders make a § 83(b) election at this time? If not, would they be 
subject to tax when their shares vest? 
In this instance, IRS guidance is helpful. Under IRS Revenue Ruling 2007-49, 
a “post grant restriction,” such as a vesting schedule, would not bring the original 
transfer of stock to the founders within the ambit of § 83.50 The basis for this con-
clusion is that the imposition of a vesting schedule alone does not constitute the 
“transfer” of stock that triggers § 83.51  That said, if both the original issuance to 
the founders and subsequent third-party investments are close in time, or otherwise 
connected (e.g., substantive correspondence between the founders and investors re-
garding vesting of founder stock that predates the original issuance of the founder 
stock), the IRS may apply either the “substance over form” or “step transaction” 
doctrine.52 In either instance, the IRS’s position would be that the founders received 
cheap stock (relative to the price of the preferred stock sold to the investor) subject 
to vesting, and had to pay tax on the difference between the value of the stock they 
received and the amount they paid for it, either within 30 days of the date of grant, 
or upon vesting of the stock.53 Of course, if this problem is not identified and re-
solved within that 30-day post-issuance period, § 83(b) may not be available, and 
the tax would be based on the FMV of the stock at the time of vesting.54 
D.  Exchanging Vested for Unvested Shares in Connection With 
“Tax Free” Reorganization 
Revenue Ruling 2007-49 explains that if employees with unrestricted stock are 
asked, or required, to subject their shares to vesting in connection with a “tax free” 
transaction under IRC § 368(a), the restriction is a “transfer” (presumably of pre- 
or post-transaction shares) “in connection with the performance of services.”55 As 
such, § 83 would apply. This treatment captures the form but not the substance of 
the transaction. 
First, the IRS interprets the word “transfer” broadly in § 83, which elevates 
administrative aspects over economic ones.56 In particular, although the transaction 
                                                          
 48. For a general introduction on this topic, see Guimar Vaca Sittic, Startup founder vesting: Here’s 
what it is and why it’s your best friend, NEXT WEB (July 21, 2013), https://thenextweb.com/entrepre-
neur/2013/07/21/startup-founders-heres-why-vesting-is-your-best-friend/. For an example of founders 
imposing vesting on one another, see Charles F. McCormick, Introducing the Founder Accord, 
MCCORMIK & O’BRIEN LLP, https://www.mcoblaw.com/founder-accord (last visited Apr. 19, 2018) 
(cited in DAVID S. ROSE, THE STARTUP CHECKLIST: 25 STEPS TO A SCALABLE, HIGH-GROWTH 
BUSINESS (2016)). 
 49. Perhaps with “credit for time served” on the customary 4 year vesting schedule, such that if the 
company were founded one year before its first significant investment, the founders would be asked to 
agree to a 3 year vesting schedule with no initial 1 year cliff. 
 50. Rev. Rul. 2007-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 53. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2018). 
 54. Id. § 83(b)(2). 
 55. Rev. Rul. 2007-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237. 
 56. See Transfer of Ownership Guidelines, MICH. ST. TAX COMMISSION 4 (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/TransferOwnershipGuidelines_423898_7.pdf. (“Cen-
tral to the concept of transfer of ownership is a change in the beneficial use of the property.”). 
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would involve administratively exchanging shares of the target company for shares 
of the acquiring company, there would be no economic “transfer” — no conveyance 
of additional or incremental value — that might fairly be deemed to be compensa-
tion.57 Had the vesting worked the other way, and the employee’s shares been trans-
formed from unvested to vested in connection with the reorganization, the case 
would seem much stronger to require the employee to recognize compensation from 
the benefit received, as would be the case if IRC § 280G applied. Instead, an appli-
cation of Rev. Rul. 2007-49 imposes a curious conformity with the application of 
§ 280G58 — if your unvested shares become vested, you are taxed, but if your vested 
shares become unvested, you are taxed! 
Second, treating a post-grant restriction imposed in connection with a reorgan-
ization as being within the scope of § 83 creates disparate tax treatment from the 
simpler post-grant-restriction scenario discussed above. In the first situation, the 
employee’s shares are made subject to vesting when a new investor invests in the 
company, and § 83 expressly does not apply. In the second, the employee’s shares 
are made subject to vesting when a business partner joins the company, and § 83 
expressly does apply. The substantive distinction between an investment and a busi-
ness combination — particularly here where the target business is not being liqui-
dated, but instead is continued in combination with another business, is hard to ap-
preciate. 
The example given in the Revenue Ruling may also raise more questions than 
it answers. For instance, a state reincorporation merger (e.g., re-incorporating a 
New York corporation in Delaware) is often done at the insistence of a new investor, 
and is effected through a merger that would technically qualify under § 368(a).59  
Under the Revenue Ruling, imposing vesting in connection with the reincorporation 
transaction, falls within the scope of § 83.60 Again, such a re-domiciliation transac-
tion amounts to little more in economic terms than a company changing its name, 
and the compensatory aspect of such an administrative event remains a mystery. 
Moreover, if the post-grant restrictions were imposed prior to the transaction 
(such that the employee was exchanging unvested shares for unvested shares),61 or 
even at some point after the completion of the transaction, it is not clear that § 83 
would apply. Arguably, applying Situation 1 of the Revenue Ruling (agreeing to 
vesting in connection with a later third party investment), the employee would be 
outside the scope of § 83 in both instances.62 A similar argument exists in the in-
stance of a formless conversion of a limited liability company (“LLC”) to corporate 
form. 
Third, the IRS’s proposed treatment creates a disparate characterization under 
IRC §§ 368(a) and 83.63 If the express purpose of applying § 368(a) is to defer a 
                                                          
 57. Id. See Barry A. Gerhart, Harvey B. Minkoff & Ray N. Olsen, Employee Compensation: Theory, 
Practice, and Evidence, CORNELL U. CTR. FOR ADVANCED HUM. RESOURCE STUD. (May 1994), 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=cahrswp (for an over-
view of compensation theory). 
 58. I.R.C. § 280G. 
 59. Rev. Rul. 80-56904, 2015-41 I.R.B. 528. 
 60. Rev. Rul. 2007-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237. 
 61. Id. (does not address a scenario where unvested shares are exchanged for unvested shares in I.R.C. 
§ 368(a) reorganization). 
 62. Imposing the vesting restrictions either in advance of or at some time after the transaction. 
 63. See generally I.R.C. § 83 (compare with Rev. Rul. 2007-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237). 
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taxable event,64 why is § 83 being applied to impose a taxable event in connection 
with an economic detriment (imposition of a vesting restriction) as opposed to an 
economic benefit?65 
Finally, and fundamentally, it is hard to understand the exchange of vested 
shares for unvested shares as being in any way compensatory. If anything, it could 
be described in the opposite way. Thus, by focusing on the issue of whether the 
exchange of shares in a business combination is a “transfer,” (which it arguably is 
not, since the transferor and transferee are the same person) the IRS appears to miss 
the larger issue of whether imposing the vesting restriction should make the original 
issuance of the shares compensatory (which it much more clearly is not).66 
VI.  SECTION 83 CREATES A DISPARITY IN THE TAXATION OF STOCK 
OPTIONS AND RESTRICTED STOCK 
If one of the Treasury Department’s goals was to maintain consistent tax treat-
ment of substantively similar activities, then a comparison of the current taxation 
of two comparable structures might be informative.67 The first is the case of incen-
tive stock options (“ISOs”) granted by a corporation.68 And, the second is the case 
of profits interests granted by an LLC.69 As a preliminary note, while the LLC struc-
ture is increasingly popular for early stage companies today, it did not come into 
existence until years after § 83 was adopted.70 To further convolute matters, many 
in today’s entrepreneurial community use the terms “LLC,” “company,” and “cor-
poration” interchangeably despite the significant technical differences between the 




ISOs LLC Profits 
Interest 
Taxable on grant? Yes (§ 83(b)) 
election) 
No No 
Taxable on vesting? Yes No No 
Taxable on Exercise? N/A No N/A 
Recipient filing requirements? Yes No No 
 
So much for consistency. Instead of the current rules, what if grants of restricted 
stock were exempted from § 83 if the shares were purchased at their FMV? Support 
for such a position actually lies within the pages of §§ 421 and 409A of the tax code, 
which provides, collectively that so long as the exercise (or “strike”) price of the 
                                                          
 64. Rev. Rul. 2007-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237. 
 65. As noted above, while it is the case (e.g., I.R.C. § 280G) that the tax code imposes income tax on 
compensation received in connection with a reorganization transaction that qualifies under I.R.C. § 
368(a), the compensatory aspect of such other instances is far more obvious. § 280G applies, the recipient 
is gaining a benefit (accelerated vesting). Where the Revenue Ruling applies, the recipient is losing a 
benefit (subjecting vested shares to vesting). 
 66. See generally I.R.C. § 83 (compare Rev. Rul. 2007-49, 2007-2 C.B. 237). 
 67. See generally Feige, supra note 19. 
 68. See generally I.R.C. § 422. 
 69. See generally I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B.1221. 
 70. Warren H. Johnson, Limited Liability Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability Shield Holding Up 
Under Judicial Scrutiny?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 177, 184 (2000). 
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option is equal to at least 100% of the underlying stock’s FMV, as of the date the 
option is granted, the employee pays no tax upon the grant, vesting or exercise.71 
A reasonable extension of this concept might be to finally quantify, and tangi-
bly credit, entrepreneurs for their “sweat equity.” Here is a simple example: an en-
gineer leaves a job (or even declines an alternative offer) paying her $150,000 to 
accept a job offering a $50,000 salary, would be deemed to have a “credit” of 
$100,000, such that the proposed exemption would apply up to the point where the 
FMV of the restricted stock granted to her exceeded the price she paid for it upon 
grant by that same $100,000.72 
As such, the taxation and administration of restricted stock grants would more 
closely track that of stock option grants.73  If anything, restricted stock grants better 
achieve an important goal for stock based compensation — to align the interests 
and incentives of owners and managers — because restricted stock typically confers 
all of the rights, preferences and privileges of stock ownership, including govern-
ance and economic participation in the form of voting rights, and the rights to re-
ceive dividends immediately when the stock is issued.74 This is not the case with 
stock options, which confer no voting, dividend, or other corporate rights until the 
options are exercised.75 Further, restricted stock grants can involve an immediate 
investment by the employee, whereas options can only be exercised after they have 
vested.76 A consistent treatment of restricted stock grants would similarly exempt 
an employee from paying tax or having to make a § 83(b) election, so long as the 
employee purchases the stock for at least 100% of its FMV as of the date that the 
stock is issued.77 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Complaining about § 83 in the above situations could understandably be criti-
cized as making a mountain out of a molehill. After all, in many (or even all) of the 
instances cited above, under § 83(b) the tax due would be zero (being the difference 
between the FMV of the property on the date of transfer and the amount paid by the 
recipient).78 The problem is a practical and meaningful one. What if you do not 
believe, or are simply not aware that § 83 should apply, or if you simply fail to make 
a timely (within 30 days of the issuance of the stock — no exceptions, no excuses) 
§ 83(b) election? In that case, tax would be due at the time of vesting, in an amount 
equal to the difference between the FMV of the stock at that time and the original 
price paid.79 In other words, all of the appreciation in the value of the stock during 
                                                          
 71. I.R.C. §§ 421, 409A (ignoring, for purposes of this article, the application of alternative minimum 
tax rules). 
 72. See id. §§ 83(a)–(b). Whether such a practice would run afoul of recently enacted salary history 
bans or simply creates a wrinkle in that movement is beyond the scope of this article and remains to be 
considered. 
 73. See id. §§ 83(a)–(b), 421. 
 74. For an overview of stockholder rights, see Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Share-
holder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407 (2006). 
 75. See, e.g., What is an Option? – Part I, OPTIONS INDUSTRY COUNCIL, https://www.optionseduca-
tion.org/getting_started/options_overview/what_is_an_option/part_1.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
 76. Tibbetts & Donovan, supra note 13. 
 77. See I.R.C. § 422(b)(4). 
 78. Id. § 83(b). 
 79. Id. §§ 83(a)–(b). 
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the vesting period would effectively be taxable to the founder or employee at ordi-
nary income rates. Again, the fact that a timely § 83(b) election would result in zero 
tax due is not the same as exempting the transaction from the filing requirement 
altogether because substantial tax could be due upon the vesting of restricted stock 
if a timely election were not made.80 While some may consider this predicament to 
be merely a trap for the unwary, if substantive economic and policy considerations 
would favor such an exemption, what then becomes the purpose of a “trap” in the 
first place? Current rules under § 83 merely create an increased administrative bur-
den that essentially serves to penalize employees who make an economic invest-
ment in an entrepreneurial venture.81 
IRS rules provide that whether or not a particular issuance of stock falls within 
the scope of § 83 depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances.82 At best, 
this is cold comfort. As a practical matter, factual analyses are time consuming, 
expensive, and ultimately subjective and inconsistent. In other instances, where pol-
icy considerations prevail, the law creates safe harbors.83 Here, the policy consider-
ations would be to create incentives for company formation and entrepreneurial ac-
tivity by affording clarity around a prevalent and integral element of that process. 
Moreover, while the administrative requirements are not overwhelming, they do fall 
predominantly on a category of taxpayers, entrepreneurs, and those still on the “la-
bor” side of the labor and capital continuum,84 that are less able to bear them.85 
It is not necessarily the case that paying employees with stock is merely a 
clever, superficial scheme concocted between companies and employees to cheat 
the government out of tax revenues. Stock is often the only currency available to 
startup companies,86 and as such, it is a critical ingredient for company formation 
and development. The costs (to the company) and the risks (to the employee) that 
accompany this practice are real and significant. In this light, § 83 appears to be an 
attempt to apply the substance over form doctrine that ends up applying form over 
substance. It cannot be a reasonable interpretation that any issuance of stock to em-
ployees should be a “transfer of property . . . in connection with the performance of 
services” that falls within the ambit of IRC § 83, but the practical burdens of testing 
                                                          
 80. Id. 
 81. But see T.D. 9779, 2016-33 I.R.B. (eliminating the requirement that a copy of a § 83(b) election 
be submitted with the taxpayer’s income tax return for the taxable year in which the property is trans-
ferred). 
 82. 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-3(a)(2) (2018). 
 83. For specific examples, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.144 (2015). For a more general over-
view of safe harbors, see Jean Murray, What is a Safe Harbor Law or Provision?, BALANCE SMALL BUS. 
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-safe-harbor-law-or-provision-398457. 
 84. It is worth noting that the very concept of a labor/capital “continuum” is itself empowered by 
equity ownership programs. 
 85. Emily Ann Satterthwaite, Entry-Level Entrepreneurs and the Choice-of-Entity Challenge, 10 PITT. 
TAX REV. 139, 145 (2013) (“The entry-level entrepreneur is forced to engage in a complicated forecast-
ing exercise precisely at the point at which she faces maximum uncertainty about her business’s future. 
These costs of deliberating about the appropriate entity are deadweight-they are burdensome to the en-
trepreneur and add nothing productive or valuable to her business or to society at large. In addition, the 
incidence of these deliberation costs is distributionally regressive, because the costs are borne by the 
group of entrepreneurs that has fewest resources to manage them, either by hiring legal counsel or in-
vesting in the self-education necessary to navigate the choice.”). See also Ryan Doody, Piketty on Cap-
ital and Inequality, MIT (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.mit.edu/~rdoody/Economic%20Jus-
tice%20Handouts/EconJusticePIKETTY.pdf. 
 86. See Tibbetts & Donovan, supra note 13. 
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or challenging such a classification make it so.87 While IRS guidance does limit the 
scope of § 83, there remains room for improvement. 
In that spirit, perhaps a reasonable adjustment would be for the IRS to adopt a 
safe harbor that would limit § 83 to circumstances where cash and stock compen-
sation are true substitutes — as may be the case with companies whose stock trades 
publicly. Second, because there are administrative costs associated with obtaining 
the potential benefits of a § 83(b) election, perhaps   § 83’s applicability itself (as 
opposed to the arithmetic result of its application) could be limited to circumstances 
where recipients pay less than FMV for company stock. This would be consistent 
with the favorable tax treatment given to incentive stock options, which have an 
exercise price equal to at least 100% of the FMV of the underlying stock on the date 
of the option grant.88 Finally, § 83 should not apply in the context of administrative 
activities, such as a reincorporation merger or formless conversion from LLC to 
corporate form. 
A.  Revenue Neutrality 
As with any tax relief proposal, revenue neutrality merits some consideration. 
Here, adopting a safe harbor would only be revenue negative for projected taxes 
from “inadvertent” failures to make § 83(b) elections. An “apples to apples” com-
parison would properly be the (zero) tax due on a properly and timely made § 83(b) 
filing and the (zero) tax due under the safe harbor. While this effect should not be 
overstated, a § 83(b) safe harbor might actually be tax revenue accretive if the safe 
harbor spurs a surge in “stock loans” that generate interest income for the lender.89 
A further (non-tax) benefit from such a surge in stock loans would only further align 
manager and owner interests, as the promissory note would equate to proverbial 
“skin in the game.” 
B.  Epilogue: An “[U]nwarranted and [U]nintended [B]enefit” 
Reconsidered  
The irony of our collective experience with IRC § 83 may well be that it could 
serve as an interesting example of the solution becoming the problem. IRC § 83 was 
intended to eliminate a perceived loophole in the form of stock compensation being 
taxed in later periods based on the value of the stock back at the time of grant (albeit 
at ordinary income rates), and interim or subsequent appreciation being taxed at 
                                                          
 87. I.R.C. § 83 (2018). 
 88. I.R.C. § 422(b)(4). 
 89. Stock loans are cashless transactions in which the restricted stock recipient “purchases” her stock 
in exchange for issuing promissory note to her company. While the predominant lender is currently the 
company itself (which may generate sufficient operating losses to negate any interest income from the 
loans), private lenders through peer to peer loan platforms may well find these types of loans appealing 
(as has been the case recently with education loans). For a general overview of the use of loans used to 
exercise stock options, see Jeffrey A. Martin & G. Edgar Adkins Jr., Unexpected Tax Consequences of 
Buying Employer Stock with Loan Proceeds, TAX ADVISER (Jan. 31, 2010), https://www.thetaxad-
viser.com/issues/2010/feb/unexpectedtaxconsequencesofbuyingemployerstockwithloanproceeds.html. 
15
McCormick: RSP Redux: Is IRC Section 83’s Overreach “in [C]onnection with th
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
No. 1] McCormick: RSP Redux 27 
capital gains rates.90 An illustrative example of the pre-Section 83 regime might be 
as follows: 
 
Year Action Tax Consequences 
1 Grant of stock worth $100, 
subject to restrictions lapsing 
in 3 years 
None 
3 Restrictions Lapse, Stock 
worth $300 
Taxable income of $100 at ordi-
nary income rates 
4 Sell stock for $400 Taxable income of $300 at capi-
tal gains rates 
 
From a contemporary perspective, I find it hard to see this as an example of a 
tax loophole. In particular, if we incorporate the illustration immediately above into 
the chart below comparing today’s restricted stock, ISOs and LLC profits interests, 
I see more similarities than differences: 
 






Yes (§ 83(b) election – 
OI based on value at 
grant) 
No No No 
Taxable on 
vesting? 
Yes (OI based on 
value at vesting) 
No No Yes (OI based on 
value at grant) 
Taxable on 
Exercise? 




Yes No No No 
 
If anything, the pre-§ 83 regime is still less tax advantageous than either of the 
other two comparable structures used today. Intentions aside, what would be so un-
warranted about that? Thus, if the above-proposed safe harbor proves unworkable 
(and reliably quantifying “sweat equity credits” may realistically prove so), a return 
to the pre-§ 83 regime may ultimately prove to be a step back (in time), but in the 
right direction (in policy). 
 
                                                          
 90. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 120 (1969) (“General reasons for change – The present tax treatment of 
restricted stock plans is significantly more generous than the treatment specifically provided in the law 
for other types of similarly funded deferred compensation arrangements.”). 
16
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol2/iss1/4
